AFRICAN AFFAIRS
fought a political battle to prevent the African Reserves being extended at the expense of the White Highlands.6 African husbandry was typically stigmatized as wasteful and deleterious to the soil, and settler witnesses before the Commission commonly expressed concern that soil erosion might spread from African lands, where they could already identify it as a potentially serious problem, to the white-owned farm lands. In fact, many parts of the White Highlands were already experiencing soil exhaustion and declining fertility as a result of overproduction through cereal monoculture.7 But in the settler view this was not where the problem lay. Instead, they drew attention to the large numbers of African 'squatters' occupying European-owned farms, and particularly the illegal and uncontrolled movement of Africans onto farms left unoccupied as a result of the Depression.8 The actual cause of land degradation was less important to the settlers than was the politicization of the whole question of African land use; the point was, quite simply, that if the African could not manage the land he had, where was the sense in giving him more land to abuse? Having put forward their view that African husbandry placed the fertility of the Kenyan soil under threat, the settler community further argued that, in the stringent days of the Depression, they lacked the finance to cope with the problem themselves, and therefore that government should accept the burden of responsibility. The Kenya Arbor Society, formed in 1934, joined the many settler Farming Associations in bombarding the administration with pleas for action against the evils of African husbandry. Conservation of the soil became the overt issue after 1933, but behind this lay the emotive question of the sanctity of the White Highlands. Settler concern was not purely environmental, and was only given expression because of the need to meet the economic crisis of the Depression. The slump in commodity prices also hit hard at African producers. The steady trend of the 1920s, which had seen the prices for most African crops improve significantly, notably maize in Kenya and cotton in Uganda, came to an abrupt end. This much Africans and European settlers shared, yet whereas the settler response to this crisis was defensive, the response of many African producers was essentially aggressive. With only limited margins of profit to be gained even from most cash crop production, and influenced by many factors other than price, African farmers continued to increase their cultivated acreages throughout the years of the Depression. Sometimes this expansion of production was stimulated by government encouragement, in other cases it was a more independent response to local economic conditions.l? Kitching and Mosley have each illustrated the point that the 1930s was a decade during which African cultivation in Kenya increased significantly, with producers able to ride out depression, often by enlarging their activities in local markets.ll This parallels the experience of Uganda, where cotton and coffee acreages continued to increase slowly through the early 1930s, rising more dramatically after 1934, and also the case of Tanganyika, where the government encouraged regional self-sufficiency in food crops with its 'Plant-More-Crops' campaign. In their response to the Depression the governments of Uganda and Tanganyika had fewer alternatives than their Kenya counterparts. Cotton cultivation was already expanding dramatically in Uganda, and as Wrigley has shown, it was not easy for the African producer to respond quickly to fluctuations in the price received for his crops. By maintaining the expansion of cotton through the early 1930s the Ugandan economy recovered reasonably speedily as the Depression lifted.l2 The Tanganyika administration, lacking an economically important African grown export crop, attempted to avoid the need for imports of foodstuffs by encouraging greater local producton.l3
The years of the Depression therefore worked to emphasize the potential, and often very real antagonism between the settler farming economy and African agrarian production. In the settler perception, the African economy continued to press in on him, at a time when his own economy was under threat. This antagonism became manifest in many ways, but the issue of land use and conservation took on greater importance as settlers tried to stake claim to the land in the face of an expanding African agrarian frontier. The cause of the European settler in East Africa was not helped by the realization that, in many respects, African agrarian production in Uganda and Tanganyika withstood the rigours of the Depression better than did the settler dominated economy of Kenya. This did not escape the notice of the Colonial Office, and was a matter that troubled the Kenya settlers, who came to fear that their security as a community was under greater threat than ever, and that their control over the utilization of land in Kenya needed to be further bolstered if the fragile resources of the soil were to be preserved.'4
Images of the Dust Bozvl
The devastation that could be brought about by erosion of the soil was forcefully demonstrated by the experience of North America in the 'Dust Bowl' of the 1930s. Through the reports of newspapers and magazines the images of the agricultural wasteland of the southern plains of America, an area that had previously been rich farmland, reached East Africa. Pamphlets and books alerting people to the dangers of erosion and instructing them on methods of soil conservation began to arrive in East Africa before 1930. This copious literature, much of it emanating directly from the United States Department of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service, under the guidance of Hugh Bennett,l5 seemed to have particular relevance to the overcrowded African Reserves of Kenya, to heavily populated parts of upland Tanganyika, and to many intensively cropped areas of Uganda. Several of these publications were produced in the late 1920s, the most famous being Bennett and Chapline's popular study, Soil Erosion, a National Menace. 16 17 These images compounded the concern of the Kenya settler over the land issue, and caused Agricultural Officers all over British Africa to examine their own localities for signs of this menace. In a sense, it became fashionable to be aware of soil erosion, and the zeal with which many young officers pursued the problem is testimony to the fact that the acquisition of a Diploma in Agriculture came to have a knowledge of this aspect of agricultural science as one of its essential requirements. Armed with their new perceptions, this small cadre of Agricultural Officers quickly identified the danger areas of East Africa Kondoa and Sukumaland in Tanganyika, Kitui and Baringo in Kenya, and Teso and Kigezi in Uganda.l8 Others would be added to this list later, and in each case the prevention of soil erosion was to be a prime justification for interfering in customary patterns of African land use. In the case of Kenya, the cause was given the active and vociferous support of the settler community, while in Uganda and Tanganyika, as we shall see, the issue was taken up with rather more caution.
As husbandry in the affected areas. The main thrust of policy in Tanganyika was to eradicate famine by increasing food production, but by over-taxing the soil this policy could be seen as accentuating the damage caused by drought. Leading members of the Tanganyika Department of Agriculture began to suggest that, while the eradication of famine was a positive aim, the permanent loss of soil fertility was too high a price to pay, drought being a major indicator that the processes of degradation were advancing.38
With the notable exception of Karamoja, drought had less effect in Uganda. In many parts of the protectorate the cultivation of drought resistant cassava had been actively encouraged since the last serious famine at the end of the First World War. In Teso each farmer was 'persuaded' to cultivate at least one quarter of an acre of manioc, and local schemes were devised to collect seed for the next years planting immediately after the harvest in order to provide a reserve against drought. In Uganda the determining factor was the commitment towards African cash crop production, attention being drawn to soil conservation by falling crop yields through declining fertility. The first detailed report on soil deterioration in Uganda, a collection of surveys compiled and analysed by the Director of Agriculture, Tothill, was prompted by the fears of the Empire Cotton Growers Association.49 It was the Teso District that absorbed much of Uganda's conservation effort, where cotton yields had declined most sharply during the late 1920s and early 1930s, despite a rapid acreage expansion stimulated by the introduction of oxen ploughing.50 A committee set up to look into the problem in 1935 made several suggestions for far reaching changes in farming methods. Among these were the resettlement of people from overcrowded and exhausted areas of the District, the introduction of a cattle tax to discourage the accumulation of livestock, and the enforcement of mandatory contour ploughing. After discussion the measures actually implemented were more piecemeal; earthwork bunds were constructed on only about 4,000 acres; selected small areas were closed to livestock to rest the pasture; and strip cropping with grass barriers was enforced. Of these, and many other methods of conservation suggested in Teso, only the strip-cropping proved really successful in the long-term. Supported by a well administered Bye-law, 90 per cent of all cotton land in Teso had been strip-cropped by 1941. An important 335 factor in this was the imposition of cash fines for failure to comply with the regulations. The shortening of the fallow period, as a result of increased population and greater cultivation, was recognised as the real cause of the decline in soil fertility in Teso, but this could not be so easily handled by legislation at a local level without a much greater commitment to enforcement.5l Soil erosion was an important question in Uganda by 1938, but it was monitored and treated only in those areas where it seemed likely to threaten the cash crop economy.
A local approach was adopted in Tanganyika. Here the settler community was mainly involved in the plantation production of sisal, and in the growing of coffee. The uncertain political status of the territory during the 1930s absorbed much of the settlers political energies, the rest being taken up with belated attempts to control the spread of coffee production among Africans.52 Therefore, the Tanganyika It was during Malcolm MacDonald's second term at the Colonial Office that soil conservation was given priority as a matter of very real Imperial importance. Macdonald did much to crystallize the ideas on agrarian reform into harder policies, but even before his return the Colonial Office had already begun to throw its weight behind the push for a conservation-conscious agrarian strategy. The previous year, in June 1937, Ormsby-Gore had pledged the government to greater expenditure on anti-erosion measures in East Africa, acknowledging that direct action was now an urgent necessity.7l This was followed in February 1938 by a circular to all colonies, demanding that they submit an annual account of all the conservation work undertaken by their various departments each year. Some colonies were slow to respond to this circular after all, erosion was not a pressing issue in all parts of the Empirebut the Colonial Office sent out regular reminders until all the reports were furnished. As the fat files containing colonial soil erosion reports from 1938 onwards testify, this was a subject about which every colonial administration was expected to be aware.72 Soil erosion can be seen to have reached its place as a topic of 'High Policy' in East Africa when a special session of the 1938 Governors Conference was devoted to a discussion of conservation policies. The papers prepared for this meeting were later published in full and circulated to other colonies, a rare enough occurance in itself to signal that something of significance was taking place.73 A similar indication was provided by the demand for a pamphlet on soil conservation in Tanganyika, prepared in 1937 by Harrison, the Director of Agriculture. The initial print-run of 600 copies was distributed in East Africa, and sent to other colonies for their information, but interest was so great that the Crown Agents were asked to arrange for the printing of a further 500 copies in 1938, these being sent, on request, as far afield as British Guiana, the Gold Coast, and Fiji. 74 At It is interesting to note that by 1938 Stockdale was already suggesting that the methods of constructing anti-erosion works then being advocated in the colonies were, in many cases, counter-productive. Following the American experience once again, Stockdale calculated that the overall productive capacity of most African lands could not sustain the current costs of maintaining antierosion works, particularly where heavy mechanization was involved. It was uneconomic to rehabilitate, or even protect, African lands by such capitalintensive means. Instead, the natural landscape should be used as the basis for conservation planning, and where larger works of construction were deemed necessary these should be undertaken without the use of heavy machinery.77 By this time the Colonial Office was already considering proposals for the amelioration of land degradation involving mechanization and its attendant high costs. These were accepted as the large-scale solutions to what were viewed as large-scale problems, and after 1945 mechanization played a significant part in the implementation of development schemes throughout British Africa. Indeed, although the costs of such action were high, the implications of solving the landuse problem by labour intensive means went far beyond the advantages apparent in simply applying methods of good husbandry. Voluntary labour cost the colonial administration nothing, but was a heavy burden to the farmer, who objected to this interventionist policy, however well meaning it may have been. 78 
Conclusion
The rise of soil erosion as a subject of 'Imperial importance' was not an isolated development, but was part of a much wider and historically more significant transition in British colonial thinking that took place during the 1930s. However real or imaginary the economic and environmental crises were, the 1930s became a decade of reassessment in British colonies and in the Colonial Office itself. It cannot simply be argued that events in the
